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INTRODUCTION 
he relationship between criminal law and clinical psychology1 is 
complex.2 Mental states are central to criminal law, so clinical 
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psychology is, at least to some extent, an indispensible ally. But the 
ultimate goals of criminal law and clinical psychology are not the 
same. Clinical psychology aims to understand and to alter mental 
states, while criminal law usually is more concerned with determining 
the existence of particular mental states at particular points in time. 
Clinical psychology wants to know what caused the delusional belief 
and how to alleviate it, while criminal law wants to know if the 
delusional belief precluded knowledge of an act’s wrongfulness or 
interfered with understanding the reason for a death sentence. Clinical 
psychology disclaims moral judgments, while criminal law is 
fundamentally a moral enterprise. 
The necessary—but necessarily imperfect—relationship between 
criminal law and clinical psychology means that when a person with a 
mental disorder is charged with or has been convicted of a criminal 
offense, the legal system should look to clinical psychology for its 
understanding of mental disorder, but should do so carefully. 
Overreliance, underreliance, or misplaced reliance on clinical 
psychology all can lead to results that are inconsistent with the aims 
of criminal law. In the past decade, at least eight cases involving 
issues at the intersection of criminal law and clinical psychology have 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article considers how carefully 
the Supreme Court has used clinical psychology’s understanding of 
mental abnormality to answer criminal law’s questions. 
The cases discussed in this Article concern three general topics: the 
culpability of juvenile offenders; mental states and the criminal 
process, including the presentation of mental disorder evidence, 
competency to stand trial, and competency to be executed; and the 
preventive detention of convicted sex offenders. Part I examines two 
cases that adopted categorical exclusions from certain kinds of 
punishment—the death penalty and life without parole—for juvenile 
offenders, based on the diminished culpability of juveniles as 
compared to adult offenders. Both of these cases built on a third 
recent case, which categorically excluded people with mental 
 
1 “Clinical psychology” is used in this Article to refer broadly to the study of mental 
abnormality or disability. Included in this field are not only clinical psychologists but also 
psychiatrists and neuroscientists, among others. 
2 See Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are Circumventing 
Both the Letter and the Spirit of the Court’s Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215, 231 
(2008) (“When the fields of psychology and criminal law intersect, it generally leads to 
tension between the two . . . .”); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 143–44 (2009) (“Criminal law and psychology have 
important, but difficult relations . . . .”). 
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retardation from the death penalty. In all three of these cases, the 
Court overrelied on the results of psychological studies to justify its 
legal conclusions. Part II discusses three cases involving questions 
about mental states. The Court misunderstood the relevant 
psychology in two of these cases. In one case, the misunderstanding 
led the Court to uphold a state law prohibiting criminal defendants 
from presenting mental illness evidence to raise reasonable doubt 
about mens rea. In the second case, the Court adopted a nearly 
limitless test for determining when the government may administer 
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering a 
criminal defendant competent to stand trial. The Court demonstrated a 
more complete understanding of the relevant psychology in the third 
case, recognizing that delusional beliefs can preclude a convicted 
prisoner’s understanding of the state’s reasons for carrying out a death 
sentence. Part III considers two cases involving the question whether 
the preventive detention of convicted sex offenders is really civil 
commitment, as states have claimed, or is instead criminal 
punishment, as its critics have claimed. Among the issues raised in 
these cases are the legal primacy of diagnoses recognized by 
psychiatrists and the moral justification for the civil commitment of 
people who are dangerous because of a mental disorder. 
I 
THE CULPABILITY OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Two recent cases dramatically altered sentencing for juvenile 
offenders.3 The first case, Roper v. Simmons, held that the death 
penalty is categorically cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile 
offender—that is, an offender who committed his offense before the 
age of eighteen.4 The second case, Graham v. Florida, held that life 
without parole is categorically cruel and unusual punishment for a 
juvenile offender who committed a non-homicide offense.5 Both 
Roper and Graham relied on the framework for categorical exclusions 
established in Atkins v. Virginia, which ruled—just a year before 
 
3 The Court recently decided a third juvenile sentencing case, primarily on procedural 
grounds. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (ruling that mandatory life without 
parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because they deprive 
sentencing judges of the opportunity to mitigate an offender’s sentence based on youth). 
This case is discussed briefly infra note 38. 
4 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
5 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). 
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Roper—that the death penalty is categorically cruel and unusual 
punishment for people diagnosed with mental retardation.6 
A.  Culpability Sufficient for Execution 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”7 Traditionally, courts—led by the Supreme Court—
have assessed whether a particular punishment (other than the death 
penalty) is “cruel and unusual” by conducting a proportionality 
review—weighing the severity of the offense against the severity of 
the punishment.8 So long as the punishment is not grossly 
disproportionate to the offense, the punishment is not “cruel and 
unusual.”9 Prior to 2000, the Supreme Court had adopted only one 
categorical rule regarding proportionality: that the death penalty is a 
categorically disproportionate punishment for the non-homicide 
offense of rape when the victim is an adult.10 In 2008, the Court 
extended this holding, ruling that the rape of a child also is 
insufficient to justify a sentence of death.11 
The Court has recently expanded the scope of its categorical rules 
to apply to offenders as well as offenses, ruling that the death penalty 
is a categorically disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded 
adult offenders and for all juvenile offenders,12 and that a sentence of 
life without parole is a categorically disproportionate punishment for 
juvenile offenders, at least for those who commit non-homicide 
offenses.13 
The first case to find that the death penalty is a categorically 
disproportionate punishment for a certain kind of offender was Atkins 
v. Virginia, in which the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment 
 
6 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
8 Until Graham v. Florida, it seemed that the Court had developed two separate forms 
of analysis, one for capital punishment cases and one for noncapital punishment cases. See 
Alison Siegler and Barry Sullivan, “Death is Different” No Longer: Graham v. Florida 
and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. 
REV. 327, 327 (2010). 
9 The Supreme Court’s proportionality review cases are few and far between, and only 
once has the Court ruled that a particular offender’s sentence was disproportionate to the 
offense. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). 
10 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). 
11 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008). 
12 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002). 
13 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). 
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precludes capital punishment for offenders who are mentally 
retarded.14 The Court explained that the deficits of people who are 
mentally retarded mean that they cannot be among the worst of the 
worst offenders, for whom the death penalty is reserved.15 In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court applied the reasoning of Atkins to conclude that 
the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of offenders who 
were under eighteen years old when they committed their crimes.16 
The Court’s opinions in both Atkins and Roper demonstrate an 
appreciation for the findings of clinical psychologists and other 
scientists—both opinions, for example, cited research findings to 
support the conclusions that juveniles and people with mental 
retardation are less culpable than adults or people without mental 
retardation.17 To some extent, this appreciation is welcome; certainly, 
research findings about the relative emotional and decision-making 
capabilities of juveniles and people with mental retardation ought to 
inform decisions about culpability for criminal behavior. On the other 
hand, the Court’s opinions in Atkins and Roper fail to take adequate 
account of the limits of this research.18 
The Court’s opinion in Roper relied heavily on the framework 
established in Atkins, in particular the foundational premise that 
 
14 536 U.S. at 319. 
15 Id. (“If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most 
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”). The Court also decided that a 
national consensus exists against executing people who are mentally retarded. Id. at 316. 
That aspect of the Court’s decision is beyond the scope of this Article. 
16 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“[W]e remarked in Atkins that ‘[i]f the culpability of the 
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, 
the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of 
retribution.’ The same conclusions follow from the lesser culpability of the juvenile 
offender.” (citation omitted)). 
17 See id. at 569–70; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–19. 
18 See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. While those who are pleased with the 
ultimate decisions in these cases might be tempted to forgive these failures, the misuse of 
research findings can have undesired consequences. Perhaps the best-known example is 
the Supreme Court’s citing of social science studies in footnote 11 of its opinion in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); citing these sources arguably detracted from 
the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decision: “In the eyes of many legal scholars who 
were otherwise supportive of Brown, the Court’s citations to social science undermined its 
integrity.” Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 n.5 (2011). 
On the other hand, ignoring science is not a solution: “The law, by its nature, is 
inextricably linked with other disciplines. . . . Science and technology permeate every inch 
of modern society and, consequently, virtually every case before the law. Courts simply no 
longer have the luxury of ignoring science.” David L. Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: 
Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of Ignorance of Science is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 87, 101 (2001). 
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psychological characteristics of certain kinds of offenders make them, 
as a group, appropriate for categorical exclusion from eligibility for 
the death penalty.19 To this framework, the Roper Court added 
research findings concerning the psychological differences between 
juveniles and adults.20 This research demonstrates, according to the 
Court, that there are “[t]hree general differences between juveniles 
under 18 and adults,” and that because of these differences, “juvenile 
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders.”21 The three differences are: (1) “the comparative 
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles,” (2) the increased 
susceptibility of juveniles to peer pressure and other external 
influences, and (3) the “more transitory, less fixed” nature of 
juveniles’ personality traits.22 The Court cites just one study in 
support of each of these differences, but the lack of more extensive 
citations is not an important flaw—no one, not even the dissenters in 
this case, would argue with the conclusions the Court reaches about 
juveniles on the basis of this research.23 As compared to adults, 
 
19 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders 
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability 
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319)). 
20 The Court also found that there is a national consensus against sentencing juveniles 
to death. Id. at 564–67. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
21 Id. at 569 (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults 
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders.”). 
22 Id. at 569–70. 
23 For example, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion acknowledged, “It is beyond 
cavil that juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less responsible, and less fully 
formed than adults.” Id. at 599 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion pointed to an inconsistency between the research findings presented in Roper and 
the argument, made in other cases, that juveniles ought to be accorded substantial 
autonomy in areas such as decision making about abortion. Id. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). As several commentators have argued, it is possible to reduce some of the 
inconsistency by focusing on the different contexts. The decision to commit a crime takes 
place under a different set of circumstances than does the decision to accept or refuse 
medical treatment. Thus, we might be willing to accept that the same relative 
psychological immaturity of juveniles should not necessarily result in the same legal rules 
in different contexts. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than 
Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA 
“Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 593 (2009) (“[T]he seemingly conflicting 
positions . . . are not contradictory. Rather, they simply emphasize different aspects of 
maturity, in accordance with the differing nature of the decision-making scenarios 
involved in each case.”); see also Donald L. Beschle, Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: 
Roper v. Simmons and the Issue of Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 52 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2006); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a 
Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and 
Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 948–53 (2006). But there is some amount of 
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juveniles do tend to lack maturity and responsibility, do tend to be 
more susceptible to external influences, and do tend to have 
personality traits that are less fixed. 
The problem with the Court’s use of research is not the particular 
conclusions it reaches about juveniles as compared to adults. Rather, 
the problem is the suggestion that these research findings about the 
general differences of juveniles as compared to adults necessarily 
compel any particular legal rules regarding juveniles.24 The Court 
does not claim that the research proves that every juvenile is less 
responsible than is any adult. Indeed, the opinion explicitly 
acknowledges that the differences between juveniles and adults are 
only general tendencies, not absolute or unvarying characteristics.25 
But in explaining why the culpability of individual juveniles cannot 
be assessed in the usual manner—by the jury—the Court asserts that 
“[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too 
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to 
receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”26 This 
reasoning uses research findings about the general differences 
between juveniles and adults to mask what the court really is 
saying27—that juries cannot be trusted to make accurate assessments 
 
inconsistency that seems irreducible—if the psychological maturity of juveniles is so 
different from adults that they cannot be subject to the same legal punishments, then 
should they not be protected in other areas as well, such as medical treatment decision 
making? This is a complex normative question about the different purposes of different 
legal rules, and the Court’s implication in Roper that there is a straight line from 
descriptions of research findings about juveniles’ relative maturity to a decision about the 
desirability of a particular punishment is unhelpful at best. 
24 The dissenters in Roper noted this problem, as have subsequent commentators. See 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 601 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s proportionality argument  
. . . fails to establish that the differences in maturity between 17-year-olds and young 
‘adults’ are both universal enough and significant enough to justify a bright-line 
prophylactic rule against capital punishment of the former.”); Richard A. Posner, 
Foreward: A Political Court, in The Supreme Court, 2004 Term,, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 
64–65 (2005) (“The studies on which the Court relied acknowledge that their findings that 
sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds are less likely to make mature judgments than eighteen-
year-olds are statistical rather than individual and do not support a categorical exclusion of 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from the ranks of the mature.”(footnote omitted)). 
25 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already 
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”). 
26 Id. at 572–73. 
27 See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 7 (2009). As Professor 
Feldman explains, 
Relying on science gives us a delightfully convenient way to avoid the problems 
in front of us.  In so many circumstances, we use science to create the Illusion of 
Reasonable Resolution where the solution is not reasoned nor is the issue 
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of culpability.28 The opinion fails to adequately support the 
conclusion that juries are insufficiently capable of determining which 
juveniles are mature and which are not.29 The Court says that there is 
an “unacceptable likelihood” that juries will make mistakes, but does 
not provide any evidence about how great this likelihood is or offer 
any reason why this particular likelihood is unacceptable.30 
That the Court fails to adequately explain its decision does not 
necessarily mean that the decision cannot be explained. Indeed, since 
Roper, several scholars have offered explanations that are quite 
compelling.31 But these explanations confront what the Court did not: 
 
resolved.  Science allows us to ignore the fact that we have failed to resolve 
anything, or it allows us to mask the preferences embodied in the outcome. 
Id. 
28 Both dissenting opinions pointed this out. See id. at 602–03 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “these concerns may properly be addressed not by means of an 
arbitrary, categorical age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which 
juries are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant’s immaturity, his 
susceptibility to outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences of actions, and so 
forth”); id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing that the Court’s “startling conclusion 
undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing system, which entrusts juries 
with ‘mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that 
buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system.’” (quoting McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987))). 
29 Id. at 603–04 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I would not be so quick to conclude that 
the constitutional safeguards, the sentencing juries, and the trial judges upon which we 
place so much reliance in all capital cases are inadequate in this narrow context.”); id. at 
620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court concludes . . . that juries cannot be trusted with the 
delicate task of weighing a defendant’s youth along with the other mitigating and 
aggravating factors of his crime. This startling conclusion undermines the very 
foundations of our capital sentencing system . . . .”). 
30 Id. at 573 (majority opinion) (“An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or 
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based 
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, 
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than 
death.”). 
31 Arguably the best of these is Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. 
Simmons and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2006). See also Jay D. 
Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Harry F. Tepker, Tradition & The Abolition of Capital 
Punishment for Juvenile Crime, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 809 (2006). Another possible defense 
of the decision in Roper is that “execution should be reserved for the worst of the worst 
and no youth under eighteen, regardless of how egregious the killing, fits into that class of 
individuals.” Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth 
Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 35 (2009). But the assertion that juveniles cannot be among 
the worst of the worst is contestable. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, The Differing Concepts 
of Culpability in Law and Psychology, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 83, 90 (2004) (“It is simply 
untrue that no person under the age of 16 . . . is []capable of carrying out a horrible murder 
with the requisite intent or foresight.”). 
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that juries’ inability to accurately assess culpability is not a problem 
that can be fixed by excluding juveniles from the death penalty. If a 
jury cannot be trusted to determine which seventeen-year-olds are 
sufficiently culpable to be sentenced to death and which are not, why 
should juries be trusted to determine which nineteen-year-olds are 
sufficiently culpable to be sentenced to death and which are not? Or 
to determine which seventeen-year-olds are sufficiently culpable to be 
sentenced to life in prison—or to any other punishment—and which 
are not? 
B.  Culpability Sufficient for Life Without Parole 
If the inability of juries to accurately assess culpability is the 
problem that Roper’s categorical exclusion of juveniles from the 
death penalty solved, the question arises: What about juries’ ability to 
assess culpability in noncapital cases? After Roper, the Court might 
have justified categorically excluding juveniles from the death 
penalty, while leaving them subject to juries’ potentially erroneous 
assessments of their culpability in noncapital cases, by offering the 
observation that “death is different.”32 But after Graham v. Florida, 
that justification is foreclosed.33 In Graham, the Court ruled that as a 
group, juveniles are insufficiently culpable to be sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole, at least for non-homicide 
offenses.34 In this case, the Court uses more absolute language than it 
 
32 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“[T]he death penalty is the most severe punishment, [and] 
the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.”). Before Graham, the Supreme 
Court had considered Eighth Amendment death penalty claims to be altogether different 
than Eighth Amendment claims in non-death penalty cases. See Rachel E. Barkow, The 
Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case 
for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court’s decision 
“eviscerates [the] distinction” between capital and noncapital cases); id. at 2038–39 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Treating juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital 
punishment is at odds with our longstanding view that ‘the death penalty is different from 
other punishments in kind rather than degree.’”) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
294 (1983)). 
33 The Court might now argue death and life without parole are different. See Graham, 
130 S. Ct. at 2027 (“It is true that a death sentence is ‘unique in its severity and 
irrevocability,’ . . . yet life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death 
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
187 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). But that raises the question 
what other punishments are also different. 
34 The Court in Graham says that the difference between homicide offenses and non-
homicide offenses is important. See id. at 2027 (“[A] juvenile offender who did not kill or 
intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”). It is difficult, however, to 
imagine how the Court would explain a decision allowing juveniles to be sentenced to life 
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did in Roper to describe the differences between juveniles and adults. 
For example, the Graham opinion describes Roper as having 
“established that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are 
less deserving of the most severe punishments.”35 But Roper did not 
establish that all juveniles are necessarily less culpable, only that 
juveniles as a group tend to be less culpable, and that any particular 
juvenile is therefore less likely to be culpable.36 The Graham opinion 
mostly relies on Roper for the proposition that juveniles are less 
culpable, although the Court does cite one additional finding, from 
“psychology and brain science,” that “parts of the brain involved in 
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.”37 This 
process of continued maturation would seem to argue against any 
bright-line rule about punishment, given that “late adolescence” does 
not end abruptly at age eighteen. But the Court ignores this nuance 
and continues to offer generalized statements about “juveniles,” 
“minors,” and “the status of the offenders.”38 
As in Roper, the real issue in Graham was not whether a juvenile is 
likely to be less culpable than an adult; instead, the real issue was 
whether the decision-makers—in Roper, the jury, and in Graham, the 
sentencing judge—can be trusted to make accurate assessments of 
culpability.39 In Graham, the Court again chose to adopt a categorical 
rule excluding juveniles from eligibility for a certain punishment, but 
it could have chosen other solutions. In both Roper and Graham, then, 
research findings support the Court’s identified problem—that a 
 
without parole for homicide offenses, given the centrality of juveniles’ categorically 
diminished culpability to the Court’s decisions in both Graham and Roper. See id. at 2055 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that distinguishing homicide and non-homicide offenses 
is evidence that “the Court does not even believe its pronouncements about the juvenile 
mind”). 
35 Id. at 2026 (majority opinion). 
36 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567–68 (2005). 
37 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
38 Id. at 2027 (“Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults. . . . [I]t would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult . . . . These matters relate 
to the status of the offenders in question . . . .”). The Court continues this tendency in 
Miller, which includes no qualifying language at all; instead, the opinion consistently 
refers to “juveniles” and “children” as being different from adults. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“[J]uveniles have diminished culpability and 
greater prospects for reform, . . . children have a ‘lack of maturity and an undeveloped 
sense of responsibility,’ . .  . [and] a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s  
. . . .” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70)). 
39 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility 
that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who 
are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.”). 
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juvenile is likely to be less culpable than an adult—but not 
necessarily the Court’s chosen remedy. To the extent that the research 
findings that the Court relies on in both Roper and Graham 
demonstrate that psychological maturation is a variable process, with 
some people achieving maturity before the age of eighteen and some 
achieving maturity later, these findings counsel against categorical 
rules regarding the punishment of juveniles based on general findings 
about their culpability relative to the culpability of adults.40 
II 
MENTAL STATES AND CRIMINAL PROCESS 
Mental states are central to criminal responsibility. In almost every 
criminal trial, the jury must make a determination about the 
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, as almost all 
crimes include a mens rea element.41 The law in most jurisdictions 
also considers whether, at the time of the offense, a person understood 
the nature and quality of his acts and appreciated the wrongfulness of 
those acts. If he did not, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity.42 
Additionally, criminal prosecution and punishment require certain 
mental competencies at several points, including at the time of the 
trial and at the time of the imposition of a death sentence.43 At the 
time of the trial, due process requires that the law ask whether a 
 
40 The Court’s reference to other categorical rules involving juveniles, such as rules 
about drinking ages and voting ages, is unpersuasive, because practical considerations of 
time and expense justify such broadly applicable rules. In the case of a juvenile charged 
with or convicted of a crime, however, an individualized decision maker is already a part 
of the system. See Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply 
the Want of Years?, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 386 (2011) (explaining that some “age-based 
categorical rules . . . such as those disqualifying all minors from voting and those minors 
below a specified age from driving . . . capture enough of the truth to make more fine-
tuned distinctions not worthwhile,” but that individualized assessment is already a part of 
the criminal process: “In the case of sentencing juveniles convicted of serious felonies, 
however, the judicial system has already incurred a substantial cost in a highly 
individualized inquiry: this particular defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of committing a certain act; and this particular defendant has been deemed to 
possess a particular culpability.”). 
41 The Supreme Court has approved certain kinds of strict liability crimes, but they are 
disfavored. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (observing that 
“offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored”). 
42 All but four states as well as the federal government recognize some form of an 
insanity defense. Most insanity defenses are some variant of the test set forth in 
M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 
735, 750–51 (2006). 
43 These points account for most cases in which competency is an issue, although it is 
also an issue at other points, such as at the time of waiving an appeal. 
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person understands the charges against him and is able to assist his 
attorney in presenting a defense.44 If he does not, then he is 
incompetent to stand trial.45 Similarly, at the time of the imposition of 
a death sentence, due process requires that the law ask whether a 
person understands the state’s reasons for executing him.46 If he does 
not, then he is unfit to be executed.47 
Although the legal principles that underlie these connections 
between criminal law and mental states are based on long-standing 
precedents, in recent years the Supreme Court has decided cases that 
involve all of these principles. In Clark v. Arizona, the Court 
considered challenges to an Arizona law that limited the scope of the 
insanity defense and to an interpretation of Arizona law that 
prohibited defendants from presenting evidence of mental disorder for 
the purpose of disproving mens rea.48 Although the Court found that 
neither of Arizona’s restrictions violated the federal Constitution, 
Justice Kennedy submitted a forceful and insightful dissenting 
opinion arguing that not allowing criminal defendants to present 
mental disorder evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea was 
unconstitutional.49 In Sell v. United States, the Court set forth the 
conditions under which the state may administer involuntary 
medications to a pretrial detainee for the purpose of rendering the 
detainee competent to stand trial.50 This case resolved some of the 
uncertainty that had plagued the trial courts regarding the question 
whether the government’s interest in adjudicating criminal charges 
could justify the administration of involuntary medications when the 
medications were not also justified by the government’s interest in 
 
44 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 
402 (1960). 
45 The same standard generally determines related competencies at the time of trial, 
including competency to waive counsel and competency to plead guilty. See Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 (1993). But see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169–72 
(2008) (ruling that the Constitution does not prohibit states from imposing a higher 
standard for competency for self-representation). Additionally, a waiver of constitutional 
rights such as the right to counsel must be “knowing[] and intelligent[].” See Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938). 
46 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
401 (1986). 
47 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958. 
48 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 800 (2006). 
49 Id. at 781–800 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
50 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003). 
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diminishing dangerousness.51 There are several problems with the 
Sell decision, however, that reflect a lack of understanding about how 
antipsychotic medications work.52 Finally, in Panetti v. Quarterman, 
the Court clarified that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death 
cannot be executed if he does not “rationally understand” the reasons 
for the execution.53 This opinion is laudable for the depth of 
understanding it demonstrates regarding the potential impact of 
psychotic symptoms on cognitive functioning.54 
A.  Criminal Defenses: Clark v. Arizona 
Eric Clark was charged with first-degree murder for shooting and 
killing a police officer.55 In defense, Clark argued that when he shot 
the officer, he believed that the officer was an alien.56 At his bench 
trial, Clark wanted to present evidence of his mental illness, 
particularly of his delusional beliefs, to support his claim that because 
he thought the officer was an alien, he did not intentionally or 
knowingly kill a police officer.57 And because he did not knowingly 
or intentionally kill a police officer, Clark argued, he should be found 
not guilty either by reason of insanity or because he lacked the 
requisite mens rea for first-degree murder.58 The Arizona trial court 
allowed Clark to present evidence of his mental illness for the 
purpose of supporting his insanity defense but not for the purpose of 
disproving mens rea.59 Clark argued on appeal that not allowing him 
to present evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea violated 
 
51 See infra note 105. 
52 See infra Part II.B. 
53 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007). 
54 See infra Part II.C. 
55 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743 (2006). 
56 Clark, 548 U.S. at 743–44. 
57 Id. at 743–45. 
58 Id. Clark is an unusual case because Clark’s particular delusional beliefs do give rise 
to both a failure of proof defense (the defense that he lacked the mens rea to commit the 
charged offense) and an insanity defense. More typically, delusional beliefs might give 
rise to an insanity defense but not to a failure of proof defense. In the case of Andrea 
Yates, for example, her delusional belief that if she killed her children they would be saved 
from eternal damnation might mean that she did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her 
actions, but the delusional belief does not mean that she lacked the intent to kill the 
children. See Christine Michalopoulos, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity Defense: The 
Andrea Yates Case and the Need for a New Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 383, 395 
(2003). Clark’s belief that the officer was an alien means both that he did not appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his actions and also that he lacked the intent to kill a police officer. 
59 Clark, 548 U.S. at 745 (“The trial court ruled that Clark could not rely on evidence 
bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea.”). 
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his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.60 Additionally, 
Clark challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s insanity defense,61 
which includes only one part of the traditionally two-part M’Naghten 
test for insanity.62 
The Supreme Court ruled against Clark on both arguments. The 
Court held that neither the narrowing of the definition of insanity nor 
the prohibiting of mental illness evidence for the purpose of 
disproving mens rea violated Clark’s due process rights.63 Justice 
Kennedy wrote a trenchant dissent, explaining why prohibiting Clark 
from presenting evidence of his mental illness to disprove mens rea 
did in fact violate due process.64 
1.  The Insanity Defense 
The law has long acknowledged that the mental functioning of 
some people is so disordered that they ought not to be held criminally 
responsible for their acts.65 Someone who is insane is excused from 
criminal responsibility despite having committed the proscribed act 
with the requisite mens rea. Today, federal law and the laws of forty-
six states recognize some kind of insanity defense, most commonly a 
form of the test set forth in the case of M’Naghten.66 Under 
M’Naghten, someone is insane if he lacks knowledge of the nature 
 
60 Id. at 756. 
61 Although this Article will refer to it as an insanity defense (because the Supreme 
Court in Clark did so), Arizona’s “insanity defense” is really a “guilty but mentally ill 
defense”: 
If the finder of fact finds the defendant guilty except insane, the court shall 
determine the sentence the defendant could have received . . . if the defendant 
had not been found insane, and the judge shall sentence the defendant to a term 
of incarceration in the state department of corrections and shall order the 
defendant to be placed under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review 
board and committed to a state mental health facility under the department of 
health services . . . for that term. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(D) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 50th 
Leg. (2012)). 
62 Clark, 548 U.S. at 747. 
63 Id. at 756 (“We are satisfied that neither in theory nor in practice did Arizona’s 1993 
abridgment of the insanity formulation deprive Clark of due process.”); see also id. at 779 
(“Arizona’s rule serves to preserve the State’s chosen standard for recognizing insanity as 
a defense and to avoid confusion and misunderstanding on the part of jurors.”). 
64 See id. at 781–800 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
65 See J.C. Oleson, The Insanity of Genius: Criminal Culpability and Right-Tail 
Psychometrics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 587, 634 (2009) (noting that the insanity 
defense’s “roots extend to Roman law”). 
66 See Clark, 548 U.S. at 746–56. 
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and quality of his act or if he lacks understanding of the wrongfulness 
of the act.67 
Arizona’s insanity law at one point was essentially the M’Naghten 
test.68 In 1993, the Arizona legislature narrowed the definition of 
insanity to excuse only those who did not know that what they were 
doing was wrong.69 Clark argued that Arizona’s narrowing of the 
definition of insanity violated due process.70 The Supreme Court’s 
prior precedents are fairly clear, however, that the Constitution does 
not require any particular formulation of an insanity defense.71 
Additionally, the Court in Clark avoided any particularized 
analysis of Arizona’s insanity law by determining that although the 
words of one part of the M’Naghten test are absent from Arizona law, 
the law implicitly includes both parts because “[i]n practical terms, if 
a defendant did not know what he was doing when he acted, he could 
not have known that he was performing the wrongful act charged as a 
crime.”72 The problem is that the Court’s example misstates 
Arizona’s law, which provides the excuse of insanity to someone who 
did not know the criminal act was wrong.73 It is possible that 
someone did not know what he was doing but did know that the act he 
was performing was a wrongful act. Clark, for example, believed that 
he was killing an alien, yet he understood the wrongfulness of the act 
he was actually performing—killing a police officer.74 To encompass 
both kinds of not knowing, Arizona’s law would need to be 
interpreted wholly subjectively, so that someone is not guilty by 
 
67 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719 (defining as insane someone 
who, because of a “disease of the mind,” did not “know the nature and quality of the act he 
was doing” or did not “know that what he was doing was wrong”). 
68 The prior Arizona law stated: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct the 
person was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act or, if such person did know, that such person did not 
know that what he was doing was wrong. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (West 1978). 
69 Arizona now defines insanity to excuse someone who “was afflicted with a mental 
disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong.” 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-502(A) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 50th 
Leg. (2012)). This law omits the part of the M’Naghten test that excuses someone who 
does not know the nature and quality of his act. 
70 Clark, 548 U.S. at 747. 
71 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1992); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514, 535–37 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798–801 (1952). 
72 Clark, 548 U.S. at 753–54. 
73 See supra note 69. 
74 Clark, 548 U.S. at 743–45. 
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reason of insanity if he did not know that the act he thought he was 
performing was a wrongful act. 
2.  Mental Illness Evidence 
Under Arizona law—at least as Arizona courts understood it before 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark—criminal defendants cannot 
present evidence of mental illness for the purpose of proving that they 
lacked the requisite mens rea to be convicted of the charged offenses; 
evidence of mental illness is admissible only for the purpose of 
proving a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.75 In Clark, the 
Court interpreted Arizona law somewhat differently, understanding it 
to mean that criminal defendants are prohibited from presenting only 
certain kinds of evidence, which the Court named “mental-disease 
evidence” and “capacity evidence,” for the purpose of disproving 
mens rea.
76
 By reconceptualizing Arizona law to exclude only some 
mental illness evidence, the Court avoided the question that really 
was raised by the trial court’s decision in Clark—the question 
whether states can prohibit criminal defendants from presenting 
evidence of mental illness for the purpose of proving that they lacked 
the requisite intent to be guilty of the charged offense.77 
In detailing the many flaws in the Court’s reconceptualized 
evidentiary scheme, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion 
demonstrates a sophisticated knowledge of the way that mental illness 
is diagnosed and also of the difficulties a criminal defendant faces in 
convincing a jury that a mental illness is more than an “abuse 
 
75 As the Arizona Supreme Court explained it, “Arizona does not allow evidence of a 
defendant’s mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate 
the mens rea element of a crime.” State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1997) (quoted in 
Clark, 548 U.S. at 745). 
76 Clark, 548 U.S. at 757 (“Understanding Clark’s claim requires attention to the 
categories of evidence with a potential bearing on mens rea.”). 
77 As Justice Kennedy explained: 
Seizing upon a theory invented here by the Court itself, the Court narrows 
Clark’s claim so he cannot raise the point everyone else thought was involved in 
the case. The Court says the only issue before us is whether there is a right to 
introduce mental-disease evidence or capacity evidence, not a right to introduce 
observation evidence. This restructured evidentiary universe, with no convincing 
authority to support it, is unworkable on its own terms. Even were that not so, 
however, the Court’s tripartite structure is something not addressed by the state 
trial court, the state appellate court, counsel on either side in those proceedings, 
or the briefs the parties filed with us. The Court refuses to consider the key part 
of Clark’s claim because his counsel did not predict the Court’s own invention. 
Clark, 548 U.S. at 781–82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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excuse.” For example, given that many people likely do not 
understand how mental disorders are diagnosed, Justice Kennedy 
quite accurately explains that allowing Clark’s witness to testify about 
Clark’s schizophrenic symptoms but prohibiting the witness from 
using the term “schizophrenia” would amount to “forcing the witness 
to pretend that no one has yet come up with a way to classify the set 
of symptoms being described.”78 And given the deep and wide 
skepticism regarding mental illness defenses,79 Justice Kennedy is 
surely correct that the witness’s testimony about Clark’s psychotic 
symptoms “might not be believable without a psychiatrist confirming 
the story based on his experience with people who have exhibited 
similar behaviors.”80 
The Court identified two reasons that Arizona’s rule prohibiting 
criminal defendants from presenting mental illness evidence did not 
violate due process. First, the Court reasoned that because Arizona 
could place on defendants the burden of proving insanity by clear and 
convincing evidence, Arizona could also prevent defendants from 
presenting mental illness evidence for the purpose of disproving mens 
rea. The Court made this connection because allowing defendants to 
present mental illness evidence to disprove mens rea would weaken 
the defendant’s burden by allowing a jury to find him not guilty on 
the basis of reasonable doubt about mens rea. Consequently, a 
defendant could be found not guilty even though the defendant had 
not met the burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing 
evidence.81 
As Justice Kennedy explains in his dissenting opinion, the Court’s 
analysis places the cart before the horse.82 Arizona’s interest in 
effectuating its designated burden of proof regarding insanity cannot 
justify depriving a criminal defendant of the right not to be found 
guilty except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element 
of the charged offense. So while it might be correct to say that 
allowing criminal defendants to present evidence for the purpose of 
disproving mens rea conflicts with Arizona’s law requiring 
defendants to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, it is 
 
78 Id. at 783. 
79 Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the Unabomber, 24 
VT. L. REV. 417, 470 (2000) (“Juries are notoriously skeptical of mental illness defenses, 
even in cases where the illness is clear.”). 
80 Clark, 548 U.S. at 783. 
81 Id. at 771 (majority opinion). 
82 Id. at 796–97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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certainly more important that prohibiting defendants from presenting 
evidence for the purpose of disproving mens rea conflicts with the 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process.83 
The untrustworthiness of mental illness evidence was the Court’s 
second reason for its conclusion that Arizona’s rule prohibiting 
criminal defendants from presenting mental illness evidence did not 
violate due process.84 The Court suggested several ways that mental 
illness evidence is untrustworthy, including that experts disagree 
about psychiatric diagnoses and that experts have the potential to 
mislead juries.85 But as Justice Kennedy points out, evidence about 
mental illnesses is no less trustworthy than is evidence about most 
other topics that juries must evaluate, especially given that trials are 
designed to produce two contradictory accounts.86 Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy astutely observes that prohibiting evidence of mental illness 
is likely to leave the jury less rather than more enlightened: Arizona’s 
“rule forces the jury to decide guilt in a fictional world with undefined 
and unexplained behaviors but without mental illness.”87 To the 
extent that mental illness evidence is confusing, it is likely because 
mental illnesses are confusing. But the cost of reducing complexity by 
prohibiting juries from considering evidence of mental illness is 
decreased rather than increased trustworthiness.88 
B.  Competency to Stand Trial: Sell v. United States 
A criminal defendant must be competent to stand trial; otherwise, 
the trial violates due process guarantees of fundamental fairness.89 To 
be competent to stand trial, a criminal defendant must possess a 
 
83 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court achieves a moment of insight 
about this, recognizing that “if the same evidence that affirmatively shows he was not 
guilty by reason of insanity (or ‘guilty except insane’ under Arizona law . . .) also shows it 
was at least doubtful that he could form mens rea, then he should not be found guilty in the 
first place.” Clark, 548 U.S. at 773 (majority opinion). But the Court did not translate this 
insight into a clear understanding of the difference between a defendant’s burden to prove 
insanity and the prosecution’s burden to prove mens rea. 
84 Clark, 548 U.S. at 773–74. 
85 Id. at 774–76. 
86 Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The trial court was capable of evaluating the 
competing conclusions, as factfinders do in countless cases where there is a dispute among 
witnesses.”). 
87 Id. at 800. 
88 Id. at 796 (noting that “the potential to mislead will be far greater under the Court’s 
new evidentiary system, where jurors will receive observation evidence without the 
necessary explanation from experts.”). 
89 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–87 (1966). 
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rational understanding of the charges against him and also must be 
able to cooperate with his attorney in presenting a defense to those 
charges.90 Because this standard is fairly undemanding, relatively few 
defendants are found incompetent.91 Of those who are incompetent, 
some are incompetent for reasons that are likely irremediable—severe 
mental retardation, for example.92 Others, though, are incompetent for 
reasons that are potentially remediable—symptoms of psychosis, for 
example.93 A defendant who is incompetent to stand trial because of 
psychotic symptoms—such as a delusional belief that his attorney and 
the trial judge are conspiring with the CIA to convict him—might be 
made competent to stand trial if the psychotic symptoms were 
alleviated. The most reliable way to alleviate psychotic symptoms is 
by administering antipsychotic medications.94 Some defendants, 
though, refuse to take such medications voluntarily, raising the 
question whether the government may compel a defendant to take 
such medications for the purpose of rendering the defendant 
competent to stand trial.95 
 
90 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (stating that the test for 
competency to stand trial is “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he 
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”). 
91 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due 
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 828–29 (2005) (“[A] small 
percentage of seriously impaired adult defendants are referred for competence evaluations 
and an even smaller percent are found to be incompetent to stand trial.”). 
92 To some extent, competence to stand trial can be taught. For a thorough discussion of 
programs designed to render defendants competent to stand trial, see Debra A. Pinals, 
Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a Clinical 
Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 103–08 (2005). 
93 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–79 (2003) (considering whether 
administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to a defendant who was incompetent 
to stand trial because of delusions violated due process). 
94 John M. Kane, Conventional Neuroleptic Treatment: Current Status, Future Role, in 
THE NEW PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 89, 90 (Alan Breier ed., 1996) 
(describing antipsychotic medications as “the primary modality in the treatment of an 
acute episode or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness”); Thomas H. 
McGlashan, Rationale and Parameters for Medication-Free Research in Psychosis, 32 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 300, 301 (2006), available at http://schizophreniabulletin 
.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/2/300.full (noting that antipsychotic medications are “the 
most rapid, effective, and economical treatment for active psychosis”). 
95 A related but fundamentally different question is when may the government compel 
anyone, whether a criminal defendant or not, to take antipsychotic medications for the 
purpose of diminishing that person’s dangerousness, either to himself or to others. See 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 
127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “This is not a case like 
Washington v. Harper in which the purpose of the involuntary medication was to ensure 
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The Supreme Court has considered this question twice, first in 
Riggins v. Nevada96 and most recently in Sell v. United States.97 In 
Riggins, David Riggins appealed his conviction for robbery and 
murder on the grounds that Nevada had violated his right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment and his right to a fair trial by compelling 
him to take antipsychotic medications during his trial.98 The issue in 
cases like Riggins is whether the state possesses an important enough 
interest in bringing criminal defendants to trial to justify the 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications, given that 
these medications can cause side effects that are dangerous and 
distressing, and also might interfere with the fairness of a criminal 
trial.99 In this particular case, the Court was spared any truly hard 
question because Nevada had not identified any interests that it hoped 
to advance by not granting Riggins’s request to discontinue the 
medications.100 The Court ruled that because the state had not 
identified any government interests that required involuntary 
antipsychotic medications, the state was not justified in administering 
those medications to Riggins.101 
The Court’s decision in Riggins was hardly surprising, given the 
absence of any findings that would justify involuntary medications. 
The more interesting and enduringly important opinion in Riggins 
was Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which explored the problems that 
involuntary antipsychotic medications might cause even in a case in 
which the state had identified important government interests that 
required such medications.102 Justice Kennedy envisioned the case 
 
that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others.” (citation 
omitted)). 
96 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
97 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
98 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130–33. 
99 The Court presumed, for the sake of argument, the reason the government continued 
to administer antipsychotic medications was to maintain Riggins’s competency to stand 
trial. See id. at 136 (“Were we to divine the District Court’s logic from the hearing 
transcript, we would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the 
defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’ outward appearance against the 
chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the 
balance in favor of involuntary medication.”). 
100 Id. at 131 (“The District Court denied Riggins’ motion to terminate medication with 
a one-page order that gave no indication of the court’s rationale.”). 
101 Id. at 138 (“Because the record contains no finding that might support a conclusion 
that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential 
state policy . . . we have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of trial 
prejudice in this case was justified.”). 
102 Id. at 138–45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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after Riggins—the case in which the government did present an 
important interest that would be advanced by compelling the 
defendant to take antipsychotic medications.103 Assuming an 
important government interest, what are the interests of the defendant 
that would be compromised? There are at least two, although Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion focuses on only one.104 The first interest is one 
that is common to all people, whether charged with a crime or not: the 
interest in making autonomous decisions about accepting or refusing 
medical treatment.105 The second interest, which is unique to criminal 
defendants and which was the focus of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, is 
the interest in receiving a fair trial.106 As Justice Kennedy explained, 
antipsychotic medications threaten to undermine the fairness of a 
criminal trial in two ways: by affecting a defendant’s demeanor in the 
courtroom and by affecting his interactions with counsel.107 The side 
effects of antipsychotic medications include drowsiness and 
agitation,108 conditions that a jury might misinterpret as a sign of 
cold-heartedness or of a guilty conscience. And both conditions can 
diminish motivation and ability to attend to the proceedings and to 
assist counsel in presenting a defense. Throughout the opinion, Justice 
Kennedy communicates quite forcefully his skepticism that states can 
justify administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to 
incompetent criminal defendants for the purpose of making them 
competent to stand trial.109 He even contemplates the implications of 
 
103 Id. at 138–39. 
104 In addition to the insightful recognition of the problems that defendants might 
experience because of involuntary antipsychotic medications, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is 
laudable for not citing as potential problems things that really are not—in particular, the 
“problems” of “synthetic sanity” and of “mind control.” See Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. 
Appelbaum, “Mind Control,” “Synthetic Sanity,” “Artificial Competence,” and Genuine 
Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 
79–88 (1983) (discussing some courts’ misunderstandings regarding the effects of 
antipsychotic medications). 
105 Prior to Sell, a few state and federal courts had ruled that this interest in bodily 
autonomy is so substantial that the government’s interest in rendering a defendant 
competent to stand trial is not an important enough interest to justify involuntary 
medications. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 953–54 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp 1497, 1504–05 (D. Utah 1993). 
106 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138–39. 
107 Id. at 142. 
108 Id. at 143. 
109 See id. at 138–39 (“I file this separate opinion . . . to express my view that absent an 
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials 
from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering 
the accused competent for trial, and to express doubt that the showing can be made in most 
cases, given our present understanding of the properties of these drugs.”). 
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his position, concluding that “[i]f the defendant cannot be tried 
without his behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial 
way by involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution requires 
that society bear this cost in order to preserve the integrity of the trial 
process.”110 
The Supreme Court encountered the case Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion had envisioned in Sell v. United States. In Sell, the 
Court set forth a four-part test for determining when the government’s 
interest in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial is important 
enough to justify administering involuntary antipsychotic 
medications.111 This test allows the government to administer these 
medications if the court finds that they are (1) “medically 
appropriate,” (2) “substantially unlikely to have side effects that may 
undermine the fairness of the trial,” (3) approved only after “taking 
account of less intrusive alternatives,” and (4) “necessary 
significantly to further important governmental trial-related 
interests.”112 
The medical appropriateness and least intrusive means factors 
primarily concern whether a defendant has been properly identified as 
incompetent to stand trial because of symptoms that are treatable with 
antipsychotic medications. Antipsychotic medications are not 
medically appropriate for general behavioral control.113 If the purpose 
of administering antipsychotic medication is to manage behavior 
rather than to treat psychotic symptoms, then the medication is not 
medically appropriate.114 And if a defendant is incompetent to stand 
trial because he is experiencing psychotic symptoms, then 
antipsychotic medications are likely to be the least intrusive means of 
alleviating those symptoms and rendering him competent to stand 
trial, given that antipsychotic medications are the only effective 
treatment for psychotic symptoms.115 On the other hand, if someone 
 
110 Id. at 145. 
111 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
112 Id. 
113 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226 (1990). 
114 See id. 
115 See Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n and Am. Acad. of Psychiatry and the Law 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13–14, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 
(2003) (No. 02-5664) (“Antipsychotic medications are not only an accepted but often 
essential, irreplaceable treatment for psychotic illnesses, as most firmly established for 
schizophrenia, because the benefits of antipsychotic medications for patients with 
psychoses, compared to any other available means of treatment, are so palpably great 
compared with their generally manageable side effects.”). 
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is incompetent for other reasons, then antipsychotic medications will 
not be effective, regardless of what one thinks about their 
intrusiveness. Thus, both the medical appropriateness and the least 
intrusive means factors largely ask whether the defendant is 
incompetent to stand trial because of psychotic symptoms that are 
treatable with antipsychotic medications.116 
The remaining two factors are where the Sell test runs into 
problems. The problem with requiring trial courts to find that 
involuntary medications are necessary to further important 
government interests is that the Court failed to explain how trial 
courts ought to determine whether the government’s interests are 
“important.”117 That the importance of the government’s interests is a 
factor to be considered suggests that in some cases, the government’s 
interests will not be important enough to satisfy this factor—and thus 
the Court is not saying that the government’s interest in adjudicating 
criminal charges is always important. But what distinguishes an 
important government interest in adjudication from an unimportant 
interest in adjudication? 
Since Sell, courts have primarily considered potential punishment 
in deciding whether a particular charge is serious enough to justify 
involuntary medications.118 But given that courts have ruled that 
offenses punishable by a minimum potential sentence of just six 
months imprisonment are “serious,”119 it is difficult to imagine the 
offense that could safely be said to be “not serious.”120 
 
116 Additionally, antipsychotic medications might not be medically appropriate for 
defendants who have other medical conditions, such as diabetes, that might be exacerbated 
by antipsychotics. 
117 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
118 Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 
1126 (2008) (“Most courts have judged the importance of bringing a defendant to trial 
based on the maximum penalty the defendant could face if convicted.”). 
119 United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans, 
404 F.3d 227, 237–38 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 
(E.D. La. 2005). These courts borrowed the six months or more standard from the 
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment rule regarding the right to a jury trial. See Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). 
120 One example is United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D. W. Va. 
2003) (“Defendant is not facing serious criminal charges upon which he will be tried. 
Rather, Defendant is charged with violating the terms and conditions of his supervised 
release imposed for his admitted commission of a Class A misdemeanor.”). Misdemeanor 
offenses, though, are not categorically “not serious.” See United States v. Everage, No. 
CRIM.A. 05-11-DLB, 2006 WL 1007274, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2006) (“Although 
Defendant is charged with two misdemeanors, they both allegedly involve threats to 
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An additional problem with Sell is the requirement that the court 
find that involuntary medications are “substantially unlikely to have 
side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial.”121 While 
this factor is an appropriate one to consider in theory, it is an 
impossible one to apply in real life. Antipsychotic medications can 
cause a myriad of side effects, many of which can interfere with the 
fairness of a criminal trial, as Justice Kennedy ably explained in his 
concurring opinion in Riggins.122 But even though side effects are an 
important consideration, it is not possible to determine in advance 
which side effects any particular person will experience. Across 
individuals, and even within the same individual across time, both the 
therapeutic effects and the side effects of antipsychotic medications 
are varied and unpredictable.123 So under Sell, defense attorneys will 
be unable to present evidence that establishes anything more than a 
statistical probability that antipsychotic medications will cause side 
effects that will undermine the fairness of a defendant’s trial.124 It can 
be hoped that, if a court allows the government to administer 
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering a 
defendant competent to stand trial, the court would continue to 
monitor the defendant to see whether the defendant does experience 
side effects that would undermine the fairness of his trial. However, 
that issue is separate from the issue Sell addresses. 
 
others, one with a firearm. The Court therefore concludes Defendant is charged with 
serious crimes.”). 
121 Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. 
122 See generally Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138–45 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
123 See United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 699 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 
FMC-Butner Evaluation noted that ‘[r]esponse to antipsychotic medication is highly 
individual,’ and explained that ‘[b]ecause it is difficult to predict an individual’s response 
to antipsychotic medication, [the APA statistics] have been provided to indicate the 
likelihood of response if an individual is treated with an antipsychotic medication.’” 
(alterations in original)). 
124 The D.C. District Court recognized this problem, although it considered it from the 
prosecutor’s point of view: 
There are many uncertainties regarding the effects that medication will have on 
[the defendant’s] demeanor and thought processes because the reaction to 
medication is unique to each patient. However, the Court rejects [the 
defendant’s] attorneys’ contention that this uncertainty precludes the use of 
medication in this context at this time. To interpret “clear and convincing” 
evidence as the defense suggests would effectively preclude involuntary 
medication in every case, since the government could never establish that a given 
individual would respond in a predictable manner, no matter how high the 
statistical probabilities. 
United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 136 (D. D.C. 2001). 
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Yet another problem with Sell is the Court’s instruction to trial 
courts to first consider whether an incompetent criminal defendant 
can be administered involuntary antipsychotic medications on the 
basis of dangerousness to himself or others before considering 
whether these medications can be administered for the purpose of 
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.125 It is odd that the 
Court would see these rationales as interchangeable—or even odder, 
would see the dangerousness rationale as preferable—given that the 
primary concern about administering involuntary antipsychotic 
medications to pretrial detainees is the potential of these medications 
to undermine the fairness of a criminal trial. Administering 
involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent pretrial 
detainees poses the exact same threat to the fairness of their trials 
regardless of the rationale that justified administering the involuntary 
medications. 
A final oddity of the Sell opinion is the Court’s expressed 
expectation that trial courts will only rarely approve administering 
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering 
defendants competent to stand trial.126 There is no real limiting factor 
in the Sell test,127 and had the Court possessed a better understanding 
of antipsychotic medications, it might have predicted that courts 
 
125 See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183 (“[A] court, asked to approve forced administration of 
drugs for purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily 
determine whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced 
administration of drugs on these other Harper-type grounds; and, if not, why not.”). 
126 See id. at 180 (“This standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs solely 
for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But those instances may be rare.”). 
127 And perhaps there should not be any limits. Some scholars have argued that 
involuntary medications are the generally appropriate way to deal with criminal defendants 
who are incompetent to stand trial. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and 
Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 915 (2011) (“What is the point of 
keeping an incompetent defendant in a hospital to restore competence if restoration is 
made impossible by treatment refusal? The intrusion of forcible medication is not trivial, 
to be sure, but neither is it so extensive that it should block the progress of the case.”); 
Douglas Mossman, Is Prosecution “Medically Appropriate”?, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 15, 77 (2005) (“Defendants are entitled to psychiatric treatment that 
may permit prosecution, and by providing defendants with such treatment, doctors assure 
that civil society will fulfill its obligation to respect the rationality and humanity of all 
persons.”); Lisa Kim Anh Nguyen, In Defense of Sell: Involuntary Medication and the 
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendant, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 597, 598 (2005) 
(“[F]orcible medication administered to render a defendant competent to stand trial not 
only protects the government’s interest in prosecution, but also the criminal defendant’s 
interest not to be held indefinitely without trial.”). The Sell Court, though, arguably viewed 
its decision as setting forth conditions that would fairly substantially limit involuntary 
medications. 
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would—as they now do—routinely find that involuntary medications 
satisfy Sell.128 
C.  Competency to Be Executed: Panetti v. Quarterman 
The Supreme Court first considered what mental competencies a 
person must possess in order for the state to carry out a death sentence 
in the 1986 case Ford v. Wainright.129 In Ford, the Court ruled that 
“the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a 
sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”130 The decision in 
Ford was only a plurality opinion, though,131 accompanied by a 
concurring opinion written by Justice Powell132—that might, but 
might not, be a narrower and thus controlling opinion133—as well as a 
dissenting (in part) opinion by Justice O’Connor134 and a dissenting 
opinion by Justice Rehnquist.135 Moreover, both the plurality opinion 
and Justice Powell’s concurring opinion used a host of different 
terms—perception, knowledge, awareness, comprehension—to 
describe what mental state was required for someone to be competent 
to be executed, without offering anything in the way of definition or 
explanation of these terms.136 
 
128 The fear that orders allowing the government to administer involuntary medications 
under Sell were becoming routine in part motivated a recent Fourth Circuit opinion ruling 
that a district court had erred in allowing such medication. See United States v. White, 620 
F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Because we are persuaded that the district court’s order in 
this case comes perilously close to a forcible medication regime best described not as 
‘limited,’ but as ‘routine,’ we reverse.”); id. at 422 (“If we authorize the government to 
forcibly medicate White, an all-too-common, non-violent, long-detained defendant, in a 
case in which several factors strongly militate against forced medication, it would risk 
making ‘routine’ the kind of drastic resort to forced medication for restoring competency 
that the Supreme Court gave no hint of approving in Sell.”). 
129 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
130 Id. at 409. 
131 See id. at 401–18 (plurality opinion). 
132 See id. at 418–31 (Powell, J., concurring). 
133 Compare Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (stating that Powell’s 
opinion is narrower and thus controlling), with id. at 969 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Powell’s opinion is not controlling). 
134 Ford, 477 U.S. at 427–31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part). 
135 Id. at 431–35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 409 (plurality opinion) (“comprehension of why he has been singled out and 
stripped of his fundamental right to life”); id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) (“know the 
fact of [his] impending execution and the reason for it”; “perceives the connection between 
his crime and his punishment”; and “aware that his death is approaching”). 
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In 2007, the Court again considered the issue of competency to be 
executed in Panetti v. Quarterman.137 Scott Panetti had been 
sentenced to death for killing his wife’s parents, in front of his wife 
and daughter, and then holding his wife and daughter hostage.138 
Charged with first-degree murder, Panetti—who had a long and well-
documented history of serious mental illness pre-dating the offense—
insisted on representing himself.139 The trial was a “circus,”140 with 
Panetti dressing as a cowboy and issuing subpoenas to such parties as 
Jesus, the Pope, JFK, and a long list of less notable deceased 
people.141 Not surprisingly, the jury found Panetti guilty and 
sentenced him to death.142 
At the time that the state set an execution date, Panetti was aware 
that the state offered his criminal conviction for first-degree murder as 
its reason for planning to execute him.143 But he believed that this 
professed reason was not the state’s true reason for the death 
sentence.144 Instead, Panetti believed that the state planned to execute 
him “to stop him from preaching.”145 Panetti’s counsel claimed that 
this delusion prevented Panetti from understanding why the state 
planned to execute him, and thus, under Ford, Panetti was 
incompetent to be executed.146 The state of Texas disagreed, claiming 
that Panetti’s awareness of the state’s professed reason satisfied Ford 
 
137 Panetti, 551 U.S. 930. Panetti also concerned several procedural issues. This article, 
however, focuses on the issue of the substantive standard for competency to be executed. 
138 Id. at 935–36. 
139 Id. at 936. It could be hoped that after Indiana v. Edwards, Panetti would be found 
incompetent to represent himself. 554 U.S. 164 (2008). But Edwards only allows—rather 
than mandates—that states require a higher level of competency to represent oneself as 
compared to competency to stand trial. Id. at 177–78. This Article does not examine 
Edwards because that case turned almost entirely on the Supreme Court’s understanding 
of the Constitutional guarantee of the right of self-representation. The Court’s 
understanding of mental abnormality played little, if any, part in the decision. 
140 Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 287 
(2007) (“And the defendant’s odd behavior ensured that the capital trial that ensued was a 
circus: Panetti, who had long suffered from severe mental illness, stopped taking his anti-
psychotic medication and insisted on representing himself. During his trial, he engaged in 
behavior that his appointed standby counsel later described as ‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and 
‘trance-like.’”). 
141 Brief for Petitioner at 11–14, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-
6407). 
142 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 937. 
143 Id. at 935–38, 940. 
144 Id. at 954–55. 
145 Id. at 955. 
146 Id. at 938. 
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and that his delusional beliefs did not diminish his competency to be 
executed.147 
The Supreme Court held that awareness of the reason for execution 
clouded by delusion might not satisfy Ford.148 The Court clarified 
that a person is competent to be executed only if he possesses a 
“rational understanding” of the reason for the execution.149 
The recognition that Panetti might simultaneously be able to 
acknowledge the state’s professed reason for planning to execute him 
yet not be able to appreciate that reason because of delusional beliefs 
is important. Lay people are apt to discount the significance of 
psychotic symptoms such as delusional beliefs because often people 
who experience these symptoms demonstrate little or no impairment 
in areas of their lives that the symptoms do not reach.150 There are, to 
be sure, many problems with the Panetti decision, including the 
Court’s failure to explain what “rational understanding” requires. But 
the Court’s recognition that for someone who is experiencing 
delusional beliefs, “awareness of the State’s rationale for an execution 
is not the same as a rational understanding of it”151 demonstrates an 
admirably deep understanding of the way that delusional beliefs can 
operate. 
III 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SEX OFFENDERS 
All states and the federal government provide for the civil 
commitment of someone who because of a mental illness is a danger 
to himself or to others.152 Historically, civil commitment has been 
considered as operating separately from the criminal law—civil 
commitment has been viewed as a permissible kind of preventive 
detention precisely because the detention was not a punishment, 
 
147 Id. at 940–41, 950–52.  
148 Id. at 959–60. 
149 Id. 
150 As Elyn Saks explains, “Psychosis is like an insidious infection that nevertheless 
leaves some of your faculties intact; in a psychiatric hospital, for example, even the most 
debilitated schizophrenic patients show up on time for meals, and they evacuate the ward 
when the fire alarm goes off.” ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD 98–99 (2007). 
151 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959. 
152 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 (1996) (“All states have statutes permitting the indefinite 
civil commitment of persons who are mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or 
others.”). 
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punishment being the domain of the criminal law.153 During the 
1990s, as public concerns grew about the dangers posed by the release 
from prison of people who had been convicted of sex offenses, 
legislatures began to enact154 special civil commitment statutes that 
allowed the continued detention of a convicted sex offender if that 
person was determined to be a danger to others because of a mental 
disorder.155 
These statutes have been challenged as providing for criminal 
punishment disguised as civil commitment. The Supreme Court has 
considered the constitutionality of one state’s—Kansas’s—statute 
twice, first in 1997 and then again in 2002, initially upholding the 
statute without reservation and then suggesting that the statute might 
not satisfy all constitutional requirements after all.156 The Court 
considered the constitutionality of the state of Washington’s sexually 
violent predator civil commitment scheme—which is virtually 
identical to Kansas’s—in 2001.157 
In the course of deciding these cases, the Court necessarily had to 
think about the particular features of civil commitment that 
distinguish it from criminal punishment. Two factors have emerged as 
important in making this determination: the definition of mental 
illness and the provision of treatment to those who are committed.158 
The definition of mental illness is important because people who are 
dangerous because of a mental illness have long been considered 
proper subjects for civil commitment, whereas people who are 
 
153 Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 113, 121 (1996) (“The criminal sanction should apply only to those who are 
blameworthy, and then strictly in proportion to the offender’s desert. Preventive detention 
of nonresponsible, blameless agents should therefore be solely the province of the civil 
justice system.”). 
154 Or to re-enact. See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL 
PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 22–23 (2006) (describing the 
Kansas statute at issue in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), as part of the 
“second-wave” of legislation providing for the civil commitment of sex offenders). 
155 E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. § 
394.912(10) (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 
Legis. Sess.); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney 2011); WIS. STAT. § 
980.01(7) (West 2007). A charge of a sex offense might also qualify someone for 
commitment under these statutes, if the person charged were found to be either not 
competent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a03(a) (1999). 
156 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 
413–14 (2002). 
157 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260–62 (2001). 
158 See infra Part III.A.–B. 
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dangerous for reasons other than a mental illness have not.159 The 
provision of treatment is important because providing treatment is 
evidence that the commitment is civil, while withholding treatment 
might be evidence that the “civil commitment” really is criminal 
punishment.160 
A.  Mental Abnormality and Volitional Control: Kansas v. Hendricks 
Kansas v. Hendricks was the first Supreme Court case to consider 
whether Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act violated any 
constitutional guarantees.161 Leroy Hendricks had been convicted of 
numerous child molestation offenses over the course of thirty 
years.162 As Hendricks was set to be released from prison for his 
latest conviction, Kansas determined that Hendricks satisfied the 
statute’s definition of a sexually violent predator; that is, he was a 
“‘person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually 
violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the 
predatory acts of sexual violence.’”163 
Hendricks alleged that Kansas’s statute subjected to detention 
people who were not proper subjects for civil commitment, and 
therefore, his detention under this statute violated the Due Process 
Clause as well as the double jeopardy and ex post facto provisions of 
the Constitution.164 All of these claims hinged upon whether Kansas’s 
statute really did provide for civil commitment rather than, as 
Hendricks alleged, for criminal punishment.165 
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Hendricks, ruling that the 
statute improperly allowed for the civil commitment of people who 
were not mentally ill.166 On appeal, Kansas argued that the statute’s 
definition of “mental abnormality” does identify people who are 
proper subjects for civil commitment.167 
 
159 See infra Part III.A. 
160 See infra Part III.B. 
161 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360–61. 
162 Id. at 354. 
163 Id. at 352, 355 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2011)). 
164 Id. at 356. 
165 Id. at 360–61. 
166 Id. at 356. 
167 Id. The statute defines “mental abnormality” as “a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit 
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and 
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In considering whether those who are “mentally abnormal” as 
defined by the Kansas statute may properly be civilly committed, the 
United States Supreme Court observed that “[s]tates have in certain 
narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of 
people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose 
a danger to the public health and safety.”168 The Court thus 
determined that the key feature of a proper civil commitment statute 
is that “it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to 
those who are unable to control their dangerousness.”169 The Court 
rejected Hendricks’s argument that only people who are “mentally ill” 
as defined by psychiatrists may properly be civilly committed.170 
The Court is certainly correct that the law should not invest any 
particular scheme for defining mental disorder with “talismanic 
significance.”171 Indeed, while the expertise of psychologists and 
other mental health professionals should inform the work of the 
criminal law, the goals of psychology are not necessarily the goals of 
criminal law, and a diagnostic scheme that works for psychology 
might not be entirely well-suited for the criminal law.172 The Court’s 
opinion looks to psychological experts appropriately; for example, 
using the inclusion of pedophilia in the current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association173 as a 
factor supporting but not compelling the conclusion that the Kansas 
 
safety of others.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.). 
168 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
169 Id. at 358. 
170 Id. at 358–59. 
171 Id. at 359. 
172 See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxxiii (4th 
ed., text rev. 2000) (“[T]he clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not 
sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental 
disability,’ ‘mental disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’”); id. at xxxvii (“The clinical and 
scientific considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders 
may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments. . . .”). 
173 The APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual contains the criteria most commonly 
used to diagnose mental disorders in this country. See Nancy S. Erickson, Use of the 
MMPI-2 in Child Custody Evaluations Involving Battered Women: What Does 
Psychological Research Tell Us?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 87, 90–91 (2005) (“The categories of 
mental disorders currently commonly used by psychiatrists and psychologists are those 
found in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV), published in 1994, to which text revisions were added in 2000 (DSM-IV-
TR).”). 
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statute identified people who were dangerous because of a mental 
disorder.174 
The Hendricks Court erred with respect to the issue of diagnosis by 
not explaining clearly why the Constitution requires that a civil 
commitment statute “narrows the class of persons eligible for 
confinement to those who are unable to control their 
dangerousness.”175 The Court’s opinion reads as if the requirement is 
simply narrowing for the sake of narrowing. But the historical, moral 
purpose of narrowing is to exclude from eligibility for civil 
commitment those people who can be held responsible for their 
actions under the criminal law.176 Typically, we count on criminal 
law to prevent people from causing harm. People who are rational 
actors are expected to be deterred from violating the law by the 
prospect of punishment—and if they are not deterred, then they are 
deserving of punishment when they do violate the law.177 But some 
people, because of a mental illness, are not rational actors. They 
cannot be expected to respond to the law’s deterrent effect and they 
are not morally blameworthy if their behavior does not conform to the 
requirements of the law. Because their impairments make them unfit 
for criminal law, they can be preventively detained under civil 
commitment statutes.178 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion comes closest to recognizing 
that civil commitment statutes should apply only to people who are 
not fit subjects for criminal punishment.179 Although he agrees that 
the Kansas statute provides for civil commitment rather than criminal 
punishment, he also cautions that “[i]f, however, civil confinement 
 
174 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In this action, the mental 
abnormality-pedophilia-is at least described in the DSM-IV.”) (citation omitted). 
175 Id. at 358. 
176 Steve C. Lee, Recent Developments, How Little Control?: Volition and the Civil 
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002), 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 385, 385 (2003) (“Traditionally, civil confinement has been 
employed for the treatment and incarceration of non-responsible, non-culpable actors such 
as the severely mentally ill or the legally and criminally insane.”). 
177 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty 
Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141–42 (2011) 
(“With respect to responsible actors, the State can use the criminal law. It can punish the 
deserving for the commission of a crime. For a responsible agent, the State should not 
intervene in any substantial liberty-depriving way prior to his commission of an offense 
for fear of denying his autonomy.”). 
178 Id. at 141 (“If the State denies the agent is a responsible agent, it can detain him. It 
can treat him as it treats other non-responsible agents, as a threat to be dealt with, without 
fear of infringing his liberty or autonomy interests.”). 
179 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or 
if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category 
to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, 
our precedents would not suffice to validate it.”180 
The Court’s failure in Hendricks to make clear that the purpose of 
the narrowing requirement is to ensure that responsible actors are left 
to the criminal punishment system while only nonresponsible actors 
are potentially subject to civil commitment invited the challenge 
presented in Kansas v. Crane.181 In Hendricks, the petitioner had 
admitted that he lacked control, and there was abundant evidence to 
confirm this admission.182 But what of petitioners who do not so 
clearly lack control? Michael Crane claimed that the fact that 
Hendricks was unable to control his behavior was critical to the 
Court’s decision in Hendricks to uphold Kansas’s statute.183 And 
because in Crane’s case there had been no finding that he was unable 
to control his behavior, he argued that the state could not properly 
subject him to civil commitment under the statute.184 
The Supreme Court agreed with Crane, ruling that a finding of lack 
of control is required; otherwise, civil commitment might simply be 
deterrence in disguise.185 Only Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, dissented.186 The point of the dissent was not that lack of 
control is not a requirement of civil commitment; instead, the dissent 
argued that Kansas’s “mental abnormality” requirement sufficiently 
distinguishes those people whose behavior can be deterred from those 
people whose behavior cannot be deterred.187 The dissent opposed the 
Court’s conclusion that a separate finding of lack of control is 
required but seemed to agree that only those who lack control may 
properly be civilly committed.188 
Even though all of the justices in Crane seemed to acknowledge 
that lack of ability to control behavior is a required component of a 
proper civil commitment scheme, neither the majority opinion nor the 
 
180 Id. at 373. 
181 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
182 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355. 
183 Crane, 534 U.S. at 411. 
184 Id. at 411–13. 
185 Id. at 412–13. 
186 Id. at 415–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187 Id. at 425. 
188 Id. at 422–23. 
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dissent makes very clear the reason for this requirement.189 But 
neither, however, do most civil commitment statutes.190 Despite the 
strong force of the moral principle that civil commitment is only 
justifiable for people whose behavior is so much the result of mental 
illness that they cannot be held responsible for that behavior under 
criminal law, it should be acknowledged that for the most part, civil 
commitment does not work according to that principle in real life. 
Most civil commitment statutes require only that someone be 
dangerous to himself or others because of a mental illness.191 Few 
statutes even mention rationality, and it is highly unlikely that, even 
in those jurisdictions where rationality is a consideration, civil 
commitment is limited only to those who are so irrational that they 
cannot be held responsible under the criminal law.192 It is surprising, 
 
189 Both the majority opinion and the dissent explain that lack of ability to control 
behavior is related to an inability to be deterred by the criminal law, but neither opinion 
explains that the inability to be deterred by the criminal law makes someone unfit for 
criminal punishment and therefore properly subject for civil commitment. 
190 See sources cited infra note 192. See also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
576 (1975) (implicitly approving civil commitment when someone is mentally ill and 
dangerous: “In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous 
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of 
willing and responsible family members or friends.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 
426 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in 
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for 
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community 
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”). In neither Donaldson nor 
Addington did the Court discuss non-responsibility under the criminal law as a criterion for 
civil commitment. 
191 See John Parry, Summary, Analysis and Commentary, Life Services Planning for 
Persons With AIDS-Related Mental Illnesses, 13 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 82, 84 (1989) (“First, almost all the statutes provide that the person to be committed 
must have a recognizable mental disorder. . . . The second prong of most civil commitment 
provisions requires that proposed patients be dangerous to themselves or others, gravely 
disabled or in need of care and treatment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
192 Alabama, for example, includes as a criterion in its commitment statute that “the 
respondent is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not 
treatment for mental illness would be desirable.” ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). An inability to make a rational decision regarding 
treatment does not, however, render someone incapable of making any rational decision, 
and it does not mean than someone would necessarily be found nonresponsible under the 
criminal law. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(6) (West, Westlaw through 2011 
Legis. Sess.) (“unable to make responsible decisions with respect to the person’s 
hospitalization”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (“lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment”). Other states’ 
statutes make no mention of rationality or responsibility. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 
334-60.2 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.) (“That the person is mentally ill or 
suffering from substance abuse; (2) That the person is imminently dangerous to self or 
others, is gravely disabled or is obviously ill; and (3) That the person is in need of care or 
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then, that in the outpouring of scholarly criticism of sexually violent 
predator statutes as not properly limiting civil commitment,193 there is 
a general failure to acknowledge that whatever is wrong with sexually 
violent predator statutes is in large measure wrong with civil 
commitment as a whole. 
B.  The Role of Treatment Provision: Seling v. Young 
The place of treatment provision in the civil commitment of 
sexually violent predators is a complex issue. On one hand, the 
provision of treatment is evidence of the state’s intent in enacting 
civil commitment statutes. It is reasonable to think that civil 
commitment schemes that are properly nonpunitive will provide 
treatment to those who have been committed.194 On the other hand, 
does a failure to provide treatment prove that the purpose of the 
commitment is punitive? What about a legislature that admits to 
mixed motives? What about a legislature that explains its failure to 
provide treatment by asserting that no effective treatments exist? 
The Supreme Court confronted these issues in Hendricks and then 
again in the 2001 case Seling v. Young.195 Together, these cases 
present two distinct sets of questions about providing treatment to 
people who have been civilly committed. The first set of questions 
involves treatment provision as evidence of a legislature’s intent in 
creating a particular civil commitment scheme. Hendricks, for 
 
treatment, or both, and there is no suitable alternative available through existing facilities 
and programs which would be less restrictive than hospitalization.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
66-329(11) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. Sess.) (“(a) Is mentally ill; and (b) Is, 
because of such condition, likely to injure himself or others, or is gravely disabled due to 
mental illness”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
legislation) (allowing civil commitment of “a mentally ill person:(1) Who presents a 
danger or threat of danger to self, family or others as a result of the mental illness; (2) Who 
can reasonably benefit from treatment; and (3) For whom hospitalization is the least 
restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently available.”). 
193 See e.g., Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and 
Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 
N.M. L. REV. 69, 84 (2000) (observing that “the Hendricks opinion has generated ample 
commentary, most of it negative”). 
194 Indeed, the Supreme Court arguably acknowledged at least some sort of a right to 
treatment in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982): “respondent’s liberty 
interests require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint.” See also Douglas G. Smith, The 
Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1399–1401 (2008). 
195 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 
(2001). 
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example, argued that because commitment under Kansas’s sexually 
violent predator statute does not ensure the provision of treatment, the 
purpose of the commitment must be punishment, and thus, detention 
under the statute must be criminal rather than civil.196 All of the 
Justices seem to have agreed that as a practical matter Hendricks did 
not receive treatment.197 But the Justices did not agree about the legal 
conclusions that should be drawn from this fact. The majority opinion 
evidences confusion about Kansas’s position on the treatment issue, 
considering two possibilities: (1) the possibility that Kansas regarded 
Hendricks as untreatable and therefore did not intend to provide any 
treatment; and (2) the possibility that Kansas regarded Hendricks as 
treatable but had other, more primary goals to focus on and might or 
might not provide treatment.198 The majority did not find fault with 
either position, seeming to accept that providing treatment was not the 
primary purpose of Kansas’s statute, and, thus, failure to provide 
treatment was not evidence of a punitive purpose.199 The dissent 
viewed Kansas’s position that Hendricks was treatable combined with 
Kansas’s failure to provide treatment as proof of the legislature’s 
punitive intent.200 It is not clear what the dissent would say about a 
legislature that was up-front about its lack of intent to provide 
treatment. 
The second set of questions involves treatment as a right of those 
who have been committed under schemes that are properly civil. Even 
if the purpose of the commitment is not punitive, does the state 
nevertheless have a legal obligation to provide treatment? Andre 
Young, who had been committed under Washington state’s sexually 
violent predator statute, argued that the state’s failure to provide 
treatment demonstrated that its commitment scheme is punitive.201 
The Court rejected this argument because Washington’s scheme had 
already been determined to properly provide for civil rather than 
criminal commitment.202 The Court did not dismiss the state’s failure 
to provide treatment as having no legal significance, however.203 
 
196 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
197 See id. at 365–66. 
198 Id. at 365–68. 
199 Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the object or purpose of the Kansas law had 
been to provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere 
pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish.”). 
200 Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
201 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 256, 259–60 (2001). 
202 Id. at 260–61. 
203 See id. at 265–67. 
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Instead, the Court suggested Young could argue that the state’s failure 
to provide treatment violated either the state’s own statutory mandates 
or the federal Constitution’s guarantee of due process, or both.204 But 
the Court was clear that even if Young succeeded in proving a 
violation of these guarantees, a ruling that the commitment was 
criminal rather than civil would not be among the possible 
remedies.205 
One issue that the Court might have been expected to address in 
these cases but did not is whether our current understanding of people 
who commit sexually violent offenses allows for accurate predictions 
of dangerousness. Inability to accurately predict dangerousness is a 
long-standing criticism of civil commitment generally.206 Does this 
criticism apply with more or less force to the kind of predictions 
called for under sexually violent predator statutes? Many people seem 
to believe that someone who has committed a sexually violent offense 
in the past is especially likely to commit such an offense in the 
future.207 Research, however, suggests that this is not necessarily 
true.208 
Another question not considered directly by either Hendricks or 
Seling is whether any effective treatments actually exist for the 
disorders that cause sexually violent predators to be unable to control 
their behaviors. Whether any effective treatment exists for mental 
disorders such as pedophilia (Hendricks’s disorder) is uncertain. It is 
more certain—although not absolutely certain—that no effective 
treatments exist for antisocial personality disorder (Young’s 
 
204 See id. 
205 Id. at 265. 
206 See, e.g., Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 439, 452 (1974) (“Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral scientists are 
able to predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient reliability to justify the 
restriction of freedom of persons on the basis of the label of potential dangerousness.”). 
207 See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 885, 897–98 (1995) (noting that “public continues to perceive, as it has for 
decades, that the threat from sex offenders is greater than it actually is”); Michelle Olson, 
Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State: Challenging Residency Restrictions on Child 
Sex Offenders in Illinois Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, 5 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 403, 
432 (2010) (noting “the common belief that sex offenders re-offend at an unusually high 
rate”). 
208 See Joëlle Anne Moreno, “Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to it that in the 
Process He Does Not Become a Monster”: Hunting the Sexual Predator with Silver 
Bullets—Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415—and a Stake through the Heart—Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 49 FLA. L. REV. 505, 554–57 (1997) (“There is no reliable empirical evidence 
that criminal recidivism rates are greater among sex offenders than among any other group 
of offenders.”). 
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disorder).209 The importance of this question is undermined, however, 
by the Court’s statements in both Hendricks and Seling that the 
existence of an effective treatment is not a requirement of civil 
commitment: “We acknowledged that not all mental conditions were 
treatable. For those individuals with untreatable conditions, however, 
we explained that there was no federal constitutional bar to their civil 
confinement, because the State had an interest in protecting the public 
from dangerous individuals with treatable as well as untreatable 
conditions.”210 
The Court’s position on the place of treatment provision in an 
assessment of a statute that provides for the civil commitment of 
sexually violent predators creates an odd set of contradictory 
incentives for states. On one hand, providing treatment serves as 
evidence that the state intended the commitment to be civil rather than 
criminal. On the other hand, proclaiming intent to provide treatment 
and then not actually providing it might be viewed as evidence that 
the intent to provide treatment was not sincere. Disclaiming the intent 
to provide treatment, on the grounds that treatment is ineffective, 
likely will be regarded neutrally when a court is looking for evidence 
of the state’s intent. These evidentiary conclusions seem to say to 
states that it is somewhat risky to include treatment provisions as part 
of a statute authorizing the civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators. Creating disincentives for treatment provision would be an 
unfortunate consequence of the Court’s decisions in Hendricks and 
Crane. 
CONCLUSION 
The ties between clinical psychology and criminal law are many. 
Mental states are important to criminal law, in a variety of ways. The 
trial of a criminal defendant, the determination of criminal 
responsibility, the imposition of a death penalty—all require the 
assessment of mental states. And culpability is at least partly a 
function of such mental states as awareness, understanding, and 
intention; we consider those who deliberately cause harm to be more 
 
209 See Donna L. Hall et al., The Increasingly Blurred Line Between “Mad” and 
“Bad”: Treating Personality Disorders in the Prison Setting, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1277, 1292 
(2011) (“Although today’s correctional treatment programs are significantly more 
promising than in past decades, proven, effective treatment for severe antisocial 
personality disorder remains largely illusive.”). 
210 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 366 (1997)). 
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blameworthy than those who unintentionally cause harm. Moreover, 
we believe that in general, deterring people from committing crimes 
is the job of criminal punishments and that only those whose mental 
impairments make them undeterable may be preventively detained 
under the civil law. Mental states thus define the dividing line 
between civil commitment and criminal punishment and also define 
degrees of culpability within criminal law generally. 
In the last decade, the Supreme Court decided cases that involved 
all of these issues. And the Court seems willing if not eager to decide 
more cases that involve questions about the proper relationship of 
clinical psychology to criminal law. The Court’s ability to consult 
psychology appropriately when answering criminal law’s questions is 
important for the actual as well as the perceived integrity of both law 
and psychology.211 
  
 
211 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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